Why does international consumption risk sharing fail? I propose a new test that uses data on bilateral imports to identify whether both trade costs and asset market frictions are necessary to explain this failure. I implement the test using a sample of 73 developed and developing countries, 1970-2000. The null hypothesis of no trade costs is overwhelmingly rejected for both developed and developing countries. Two versions of the test give contrasting results on the role of asset market frictions. The baseline test does not reject the null hypothesis of frictionless asset markets within developed countries, though it does reject between developed and developing countries. A variant on the baseline test …nds that the marginal utility of wealth moves with current income for both developed and developing countries. But the sensitivity of the marginal utility of wealth to income in developed countries is 1/3 of what it is in developing countries, and is only marginally signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Introduction
In a world where there are no frictions in goods markets, and a full set of contingent claims can be traded, the growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption is perfectly correlated across countries. This prediction is strongly rejected by the data (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland [1992] and Lewis [1996] ). A substantial literature has proposed di¤erent types of asset and goods market frictions as potential explanations for this rejection. A notable contribution is Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) , who suggest that trade costs alone may go a long way to resolving this as well as other puzzles in international macroeconomics. While asset market frictions reduce countries'ability to smooth their consumption, trade costs make smoothing costly, so it is optimal for the marginal utility of consumption to respond to changes in output.
The main contribution of this paper is to present a test based on bilateral trade data that can identify whether both asset market frictions and goods market frictions (speci…cally, trade costs) are necessary to explain the failure of risk sharing. I implement the test using a sample of 73 developed and developing countries. For the sample as a whole, both frictions are found to be present. However, for a developed country subsample, the null hypothesis of no frictions in asset markets cannot be rejected using the baseline test. A modi…ed version of the test rejects the no asset market frictions null for these developed counties, but at a marginal signi…cance level.
The framework within which the test is developed is a multi-country DSGE model with Armington specialization, iceberg costs of shipping goods across countries and a very general asset market structure. The asset market structure is general enough to nest the cases usually considered in the literature on risk sharing: frictionless asset markets; …nancial autarky; an exogenously restricted set of assets, possibly with borrowing constraints and/ or limited enforceability of intertemporal contracts. There is a corresponding disadvantage of generality. Since I do not characterize the asset market structure, I cannot use the estimates I obtain to analyze the potential welfare gains from eliminating asset market frictions.
Identi…cation requires me to place more structure on the nature of goods market frictions than on the asset market side. In focusing on trade costs, I follow Backus, Kehoe and Kydland [1992, 1995] , Dumas [1992] , Dumas and Uppal [2001] , Heathcote and Perri [2004] , Kose and Yi [2005] , Mazzenga and Ravn [2004] , as well as Obstfeld and Rogo¤ [2000] . By assuming multiple countries, complete specialization and country-pair speci…c iceberg trade costs, the modeling approach closely follows the structural gravity literature (most recently, Anderson and van Wincoop [2003, 2004] and Eaton and Kortum [2002] ) which aims to explain the full matrix of bilateral trade ‡ows. This approach gives the model a chance to match facts about both intra-temporal and inter-temporal trade, while simultaneously allowing for potential risk sharing through the terms of trade as described in Cole and Obstfeld [1991] .
Standard tests of the null hypothesis of frictionless asset markets (e.g. Townsend [1994] , Lewis [1996] ) are easily modi…ed to take account of potential costs of trade by controlling for relative prices. But these tests do not have enough degrees of freedom to identify simultaneously the role of the two types of friction in impeding risk sharing. To identify the two frictions separately and simultaneously, I make use of the …rst order conditions governing demand for individual goods. Each country specializes in a distinct good. If there is consumption risk sharing, it must take place through ‡ows of these goods. For each country, there are as many of these …rst order conditions as there are goods. The marginal utility of wealth appears in each …rst order condition, but is the same for all goods imported by a particular country, so it can be controlled for using time-varying country …xed e¤ects. By placing restrictions on the behavior of these …xed e¤ects, it is possible to test the null hypothesis of no frictions in asset markets. On the goods market side, estimating these multiple …rst order conditions amounts to estimating a gravity model of trade. This allows the role of trade costs to be identi…ed, as the literature on structural gravity models has demonstrated. I implement the test using bilateral import data for a sample of 73 developed and developing countries from 1970-2000. As a baseline, I test the hypothesis that the marginal utility of wealth is constant over time. Using this approach, I reject the null of frictionless …nancial markets between developing and developed countries, while not being able to reject the null of frictionless asset markets within developed countries. A stronger version of the test examines whether the marginal utility of wealth responds to current income. This test rejects the null of frictionless …nancial markets within developed countries as well as between developed and developing countries. However the estimated sensitivity of the marginal utility of wealth to current income in developed countries is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero only at the 10% level and is 1/3 what it is in the full sample. The null hypothesis of zero trade costs is overwhelmingly rejected for both developed and developing countries. I …nd that trade costs are large and economically signi…cant, though they fall substantially over the sample period. These results are robust to the modi…cation of several features of the empirical implementation.
While methodologically, the approach presented here is closest to the tests of consumption insurance in Townsend [1994] and Lewis [1996] , it is also related to the literature on the relationship between consumption and real exchange rates (Backus and Smith [1993] ; Kollmann [1995] ; Ravn [2001] ; Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc [2006] ). The weak rejection of the null hypothesis of no asset market frictions for developed countries is at odds with the …ndings of that literature. The reason for this di¤erence lies in the way that real exchange rates (and real consumption) are measured. The test presented here does not require CPI data or data on real consumption. It is implicitly based on relative prices that are consistent with observed trade ‡ows being generated by a gravity model of trade. These relative prices behave quite di¤erently from the real exchange rates constructed using CPI data, and imply more risk sharing than CPI-based real exchange rates.
The …rst section of the paper lays out the theoretical framework. The second section describes the tests for the role of frictions. The third section goes into more detail on the precise empirical strategy employed. The fourth section describes the data and results, presents some robustness tests, and discusses why the results are di¤erent from the previous literature. The …nal section concludes.
Theoretical framework Summary
There are N countries in the world, indexed i = 1; : : : ; N . Each country produces a distinct intermediate good (also indexed i) using capital and labor. Capital is accumulable. Productivity in the production of these intermediate goods is stochastic, and may di¤er across countries. The intermediate goods are tradeable (at some cost). They are combined using a CES aggregator, the same in all countries, to produce a non-tradeable aggregate good used for consumption and investment. Asset markets are complete and frictionless within countries, but there may be exogenous or endogenous limitations on the contracts that can be written across countries.
Uncertainty
In each period t, the economy experiences one event, s t 2 S. Denote by s t the history of events from date 0 to date t. The probability of history s t at date t is given by t (s t ).
Preferences and technology
For simplicity, the problem is described as if country i had a single agent with expected utility given by:
available to country i at s t . Assets are de…ned such that they are in zero net supply:
This setup is general enough to encompass frictionless asset markets, …nancial autarky, and a variety of di¤erent types of frictions that allow for partial risk sharing through asset markets.
Sequential competitive equilibrium
At each point in time, country i chooses
expected utility (1) subject to its aggregate good resource constraint:
and its (nominal) budget constraint:
where R t (s t ), D t (s t ) and Q t (s t ), are taken as given, and
A competitive equilibrium is a vector of prices (Q ; R ) and a vector of quantities for each
) such that each country solves the above problem at every realized state s t and (5), (7) and (8) hold for all realized s t (i.e. all markets clear).
First order conditions
Assume the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Then for any s t and for given K and B , the …rst order conditions with respect to aggregate consumption and absorption of each intermediate are necessary and su¢ cient for competitive equilibrium (the problem of country i at s t is convex).
The …rst order condition with respect to 
The 's have an alternative interpretation as the (time-varying) per capita Pareto weights for each country in a series of intra-temporal planning problems. A useful normalization of the 's (and consequently, prices) suggested by this interpretation is P 
subject to (for all i and s t ) the resource constraints (5) and (8) . The …rst order conditions for this problem are exactly (10) and (12), with constant i . In particular, the relative marginal utility of nominal wealth does not depend on current income.
Asset markets with frictions
More generally, the relative marginal utility of nominal wealth varies across states and over time. Aiyagari [1994] and Krusell and Smith [1998] show that when agents can hold only one asset, and there is an exogenous borrowing limit, the sensitivity of i t (s t ) to current income varies with the level of wealth. High wealth agents are approximately permanent income consumers, implying a low sensitivity idiosyncratic shocks to current income. Agents with low wealth are more likely to be constrained, and hence to have consumption and wealth that responds a lot to current income. When asset markets are complete, but there is limited enforcement, the marginal utility of wealth of one agent relative to another is constant if neither agent is tempted to default. For constrained agents, wealth and the marginal utility of wealth must change by an amount necessary to make them indi¤erent between default and remaining in the market (Kocherlakota [1996] ; Kehoe and Perri [2002] ). This implies that their marginal utility of wealth is sensitive to current income. In short, commonly assumed con…gurations of asset market frictions imply that i t (s t ) may respond to current income, but the magnitude of that response varies across agents and over time.
3 Why does risk sharing fail?
Tests based on aggregate consumption and real exchange rates From (10), relative marginal utility of consumption is given by:
In the presence of trade costs and frictions in asset markets, relative marginal utility of consumption can vary for two reasons. First, with frictions in asset markets,
need not be constant. In particular, relative wealth may respond to current output, as sketched above. Second, in order for consumption risk sharing to take place, goods must be shipped internationally. If shipping is costly, agents will optimally choose not to smooth consumption perfectly. The e¤ect of trade costs is perfectly captured by the real exchange
, which varies with current output when trade is costly.
To see this second e¤ect more clearly, rewrite (14) as:
The numerator in the second term in (15) is a weighted average of the output of all countries, where the weights are inversely proportional to the cost of shipping to country i. The denominator is a similar weighted average where the weights are inversely proportional to the cost of shipping to country j. Trade costs induce a correlation between consumption growth rates and output growth rates even in the absence of frictions in asset markets.
Tests of international consumption insurance that follow the approach of Townsend [1994] (such as those in Lewis [1996] ) look at whether relative traded goods consumption growth rates are correlated with relative output growth rates. 
Equation (17) Now the …rst order condition for aggregate consumption tells us that:
This implies that (17) can be rewritten:
Equation (20) holds in the presence of trade costs ( ik t 6 = 1) and frictions in goods markets ( i t 6 = i ). Standard "gravity"variables can be used to control for trade costs ik t . There are N equations for each importer country i at a given point in time (one for each good), and
) appears in all of them. Similarly, for each good k, there are N equations at a point in time (one for each export destination), and k t appears in all of them. This implies that importer-year …xed e¤ects and exporter-year …xed e¤ects can be used to control
It is straightforward to impose the null hypothesis of frictionless asset markets, i.e. i t (s t ) = i in this framework. If the marginal utility of aggregate consumption is controlled for, i is can be picked up by by an importer …xed e¤ect. The resulting expression is nested in (20) , so the null of frictionless asset markets can be tested against the alternative of some asset market friction using a likelihood ratio test.
It is also straightforward to impose the joint hypothesis of …nancial autarky and symmetric trade costs. Under …nancial autarky, total imports must be equal to total exports for all countries, i.e. aggregate trade must be balanced. If in addition ik t = ki t 8i; k; t, the symmetric structure of the model implies that bilateral trade must also be balanced, so we
That is, symmetry must be imposed on the importeryear and exporter-year …xed e¤ects. Again, the resulting expression is nested in (20) , so the null of …nancial autarky can be tested against the alternative of some asset trade using a likelihood ratio test.
Finally, in the absence of trade costs, the composition of the expenditure basket is always identical across countries, irrespective of the nature of frictions in the asset market (these shift the size of the basket across periods and states, but not its composition). Prices are the same everywhere: P i t = P j t = P t , and the right hand side of (20) reduces to the inverse of world GDP. The assumption of no trade costs can therefore be imposed by regressing the dependent variable on a time …xed e¤ect alone. As before, this is nested in (20) , so the null of no trade costs can be tested against the alternative of some trade costs using a likelihood ratio test.
To summarize, we have the following four models implied by di¤erent con…gurations of frictions, where model (a) nests models (b), (c) and (d):
Summary of Predictions Asset market Trade costs
The implementation of the test is described in the next section.
This approach to identifying why international risk sharing fails di¤ers from the previous literature along three dimensions. First, it provides a common framework for identifying the role of trade costs and asset market frictions. This contrasts with Lewis [1996] , who does not take account of the possibility of goods market frictions over and above non-traded goods. It contrasts with the literature on consumption-real exchange rate correlations, which controls for goods market frictions (if present) by conditioning on real exchange rates, but which does not directly identify the presence or nature of these frictions.
Second, the estimation of multiple …rst order conditions for each country makes it possible to test the hypothesis that the relative marginal utility of wealth is constant against the alternative that it varies over time, without making any assumptions about the relationship between i t and particular variables. As sketched above, the relationship between the relative marginal utility of wealth and current output is likely to di¤er across countries and over time.
In addition, as Cochrane [1991] points out, correlated measurement error in consumption and output could lead tests based on the relationship between these two variables to reject the null of no asset market frictions incorrectly. However it is simple to nest the Townsend [1994] and Lewis [1996] approach within this framework by testing whether current output enters signi…cantly on the right hand side in model (c).
Finally, as I elaborate below, using this test, it is not necessary to use CPI data or de ‡ators to construct real exchange rates or recover real consumption. The test can be implemented using value data alone. Value data are less likely to be subject to measurement error than data on prices or quantities. In addition, this sidesteps the problem that measured price indexes may be poor proxies for the utility-consistent prices suggested by theory.
Empirical strategy
Functional form for marginal utility Some assumptions must be made about the form of the marginal utility of consumption in order to implement the test. For expositional purposes, the possibility of a labor-leisure tradeo¤ has been suppressed until this point. In the empirical implementation, it is straightforward to allow for this tradeo¤ and potential non-separability between consumption and leisure. Suppose that u ( ) takes the form:
for some v ( ) with the appropriate properties. The …rst order condition for aggregate consumption can be written:
The labor-leisure tradeo¤ and potential non-separability of this form do not a¤ect any of the expressions in the previous section beyond modifying the form of marginal utility. 2 
Value data on consumption
Given that the test implicitly involves estimating P i t , it is both convenient and internally consistent not to use any information on aggregate prices or real exchange rates in implementing it. The assumed form for the utility function allows the …rst order condition for aggregate consumption, (10) , to be rewritten as a function of the value of consumption:
Trade costs 2 The additional intratemporal …rst order condition is not exploited in the test.
The standard assumption in the empirical gravity literature on the form of bilateral trade costs is (see Anderson and van Wincoop [2004] ):
Commonly used "gravity variables" (G ik n ) include bilateral distance, dummies for common language, colonial heritage and legal origins. In general, the number of gravity variables J N 2 , where N 2 is the number of bilateral pairs included in the regressions. Ideally, bilateral barriers due to trade policy should also be controlled for. This would not require modifying the empirical approach; However constructing the required data is beyond the scope of this paper.
Implementation
Taking models (a) to (d) from the previous section, substituting in the expression for trade costs and taking logs yields four linear models. Let w 
Given the large numbers of …xed e¤ects, (a), (b) and (c) are estimated as two-way …xed e¤ects models. Likelihood ratio tests are used to test (b), (c) and (d) against the alternative of (a).
An alternative test combines the Townsend [1994] approach with the strategy developed here. Let gdp
. Include this variable on the right hand 3 The restrictions on the relationships between k t and the other variables in models (a), (b), and (c) cannot be imposed because data on the full universe of bilateral pairs would be required. 4 Symmetric trade costs must also be assumed.
side in estimating (c):
Under the frictionless asset market null, the relative marginal utility of nominal wealth does not respond to current income, so y should not be signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Remaining data issues
The data used is described in the next section. For roughly 1/3 of the country pairs in the sample, bilateral imports are recorded as zero. As standard in the gravity literature, to avoid dropping these observations from the bilateral tests, w ik t is constructed as
I test the robustness of the results to this choice. The model presented above is of a world where gross output equals value added. The fact that this is not the case in the data is re ‡ected in ratios of exports to GDP that exceed 1 for some countries in the sample. Since the dependent variable, w ik t , is a ratio of an output quantity to a value added quantity, this is of concern. It is straightforward to modify the model to allow gross output and value added to di¤er. Asume that the intermediate goods have a production function that takes the form:
is the quantity of the aggregate good (materials) used in the production of intermediates. The value share of materials in gross output is equal to . The gravity equations on which the bilateral tests are based are unchanged, except that GDP is replaced by gross output and expenditure is replaced by expenditure gross of materials. Data on gross output is not generally available, but for a given value for , a model-consistent estimate is given by
A value of = 0:5 is assumed, consistent with the fact that the average ratio of gross output to GDP in the OECD Intersectoral Database is approximately equal to 2. A country's absorption of its own output is then calculated as gross output less exports. These observations (i.e. countries'imports from themselves) are included in the baseline analysis. Robustness of the results to the construction of gross output is tested.
Data and results
All data is annual. Population, the current dollar value of GDP, the current dollar value of total expenditure, the current dollar value of total imports and the value share of private consumption expenditures in GDP are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). The employment rate is taken from the Penn World Tables 
Results
Baseline bilateral tests Table 1 reports the results from estimating the four models described above using all bilateral pairs in the 73-country sample. In the baseline speci…cation, the coe¢ cients on the gravity variables are allowed to vary by 5-year period. The estimated coe¢ cients on the gravity variables are fairly standard and stable across speci…cations. Based on equation (23) costs is rejected at all signi…cance levels.
Do developed and developing countries face di¤erent frictions?
To test the hypothesis that asset market frictions are less salient between developed countries than developed and developing countries, I repeat the exercise just described using only observations on bilateral imports between 22 developed countries. The countries included in this subsample are listed in the Appendix. The estimation results are reported in Table 3 .
The magnitude of the coe¢ cients on the gravity variables in the models with trade costs are di¤erent from those in the full sample, and the implied trade costs are substantially smaller.
Overall, the models with trade costs explain a good deal more of the variation within this subsample than they do in the full sample of 73 countries. Table 4 reports the likelihood ratio test statistics and associated p-values for the developed country sub-sample. The null hypothesis of no asset market frictions and costly trade cannot be rejected for this sample. The null of …nancial autarky is rejected at all levels of signi…cance. The null of no trade costs is rejected at all levels of signi…cance. However the coe¢ cient on distance and the implied trade costs are smaller than in the pooled sample. 5 Implementation of the same tests for sub-samples of 22 countries that contain both developed and developing countries indicate that the failure to reject the no asset market frictions null for developed countries is not due to the di¤erence in sample size. The developed country subsample is closer to perfect risk sharing than the full sample, both because trade costs are lower, and because frictions in asset markets are less salient.
Are frictions declining in importance over time?
I split the sample and estimate the four models separately on the period 1970-1984 and the period 1985-2000. Table 5 reports the likelihood ratio test statistics and associated p-values for the two sub-samples. In both the earlier period and the later period, the null of no asset market frictions and costly goods trade is rejected against the alternative of frictions in both goods and asset markets, though the likelihood ratio statistic is much lower in the later period. Similarly, the null of …nancial autarky is rejected in favor of the alternative of some risk sharing through …nancial markets, and the null of no trade costs is strongly rejected in both periods. These results are mildly suggestive of some weakening in asset market frictions over time.
More about asset market frictions and trade costs
The estimated coe¢ cients on the gravity variables from the unrestricted model (the …rst column of Table 1 The estimates of the importer …xed-e¤ects from the unrestricted model can be used to recover^ i t , the implied inverse marginal utility of per capita wealth, or per capita Pareto weight, for each country. This requires some assumptions about the parameters and of the utility function, and the elasticity of substitution . If = 0 (utility separable between consumption and leisure), we have: Table 6 reports summary statistics for the distribution of the coe¢ cient of variation of^ for the sample as a whole.
Alternative test
As described in the previous section, it is possible to combine a test for the presence of frictions in asset markets that closely follows Townsend [1994] and Lewis [1996] with the bilateral import framework used here. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 8 report the results from estimating model (e) in the full sample and in the developed country sub-sample respectively (columns 1 and 3 repeat the estimates of the model that imposes no frictions in asset markets for comparison). In both cases, the coe¢ cient on relative GDP per capita is positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. In the case of the full sample, it is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 5% level. In the case of the developed country subsample, the coe¢ cient is less than 1/3 as big, and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero only at the 10% level. This ranking is consistent with the results from the baseline test, though this test appears to have stronger power against the no asset market frictions null. These zeros can be interpreted as true zeros -due to …xed costs of trade -or as positive values censored by some rounding down or measurement error in the data collection process. A popular strategy for dealing with zeros in the estimation of log-linear gravity equations is to drop these observations. Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein [2007] argue that with …xed costs of exporting and selection into exporting, this leads to a downward bias in the estimated costs of trade (this is distinct from the upward bias due to failure to control for the extensive margin referred to before). The estimation strategy I employ avoids dropping these observations by adding 1 to bilateral imports before normalizing by importer expenditure and exporter GDP to get the dependent variable. When the alternative strategy of dropping the zeros is employed, estimated per unit trade costs fall. However the results of the likelihood ratio tests are unchanged. All restrictions on the two-frictions model are rejected for the full 73-country sample, while the trade cost, no asset market frictions null cannot be rejected for the developed country sub-sample.
Robustness

5-year aggregation of the data
It is possible that some of the zeros in bilateral imports are due to infrequent trade rather than no trade -zeros are more frequent in quarterly or monthly data. The model does not specify what is the length of a period. It is customary to use annual data to estimate gravity equations, but there is no reason why longer frequencies should not be used. When the data is aggregated over 5-year periods, de ‡ating nominal variables by the US consumer price index, the results are very similar to the baseline. The null of trade costs but frictionless asset markets is rejected for the sample as a whole, but cannot be rejected for the developed country subsample. In all other cases, the null is rejected in favor of the unrestricted 2-frictions model.
Exclusion of estimates of trade with self
The baseline sample includes observations on a country's estimated absorption of domestic output, constructed under the assumption that the ratio of gross output to value added is equal to 2 for all countries and all periods. These observations are not necessary for the test. When these observations are not included, and GDP is used in the test rather than the estimate of gross output, estimated trade costs are somewhat larger. But the results of the likelihood ratio tests are very similar. The null hypothesis of trade costs but frictionless asset markets is rejected for the sample as a whole, but cannot be rejected for the developed country subsample. In all other cases, the null is rejected in favor of the alternative.
Discussion
Why the results di¤er from the previous literature
The results of the tests I present are somewhat more favorable to the null hypothesis of no asset market frictions between developed countries than previous results in the literature.
As explained in section 3, the test I use di¤ers from the previous literature along three dimensions. The most important di¤erence, as regards driving the di¤erence in results, is the fact that I do not use measured CPI data to construct real exchange rates, real consumption, or indeed any variable. The test uses only data on values. The rich bilateral structure of the data, combined with strong functional form assumptions, is used to estimate implicitly the relative prices that are consistent with a gravity structure for bilateral trade. The ability of restricted versions of these estimates (and their comovement with the value of aggregate consumption) to explain the variation in bilateral trade is what drives the test results.
To understand how it is that these implicit relative price estimates give a di¤erent view of the nature of frictions in asset markets, it is useful to consider the correlation between them and more standard measures of bilateral real exchange rates. The following real exchange rate variable can be constructed using the importer-year …xed e¤ects from the unrestricted model: for all bilateral pairs in the sample. For the sample as a whole, the median correlation is -0.07. For pairs of OECD countries, the median correlation is -0.17.
Clearly, the variation in the implied real exchange rates on which the test in this paper is based is di¤erent from the variation in measured CPI real exchange rates. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate in detail why this is so. Su¢ ce to say that, using models with multiple heterogeneous goods, Ghironi On the trade cost side, a rigorous analysis must take into account the e¤ect of changing trade costs on intertemporal trade as well as intratemporal trade, and hence requires taking a stand on asset market frictions. For example, Guibaud (2005) shows that when there is an enforcement friction in international asset markets, reducing trade costs relaxes borrowing constraints. However, as a …rst pass one can consider the following simple calculation.
Assume that trade costs really are iceberg trade costs. Suppose we reduce all trade costs by 10% while holding the value of all trade ‡ows …xed (Even with a very high value of the elasticity of stubstitution , the estimates underlying Table 7 Normalized Pareto Weight for 4 East Asian countries
